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The human-computer interaction (HCI) community is diverse. 
Academics and practitioners from science, engineering, and design 
contribute to its lively development, but communication and coop-
eration between the different groups is often challenging. Designers 
struggle to apply the results of scientific studies to their design prob-
lems. At times, open conflicts between the different groups emerge, 
in particular between scientists and designers, since they have the 
least common ground.1
The Computer Human Interaction (CHI) Conference of the 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), which is the largest 
and arguably one of the most important conferences in the field, 
is organized through the Special Interest Group Computer Human 
Interaction (SIGCHI). At the 2005 SIGCHI membership meeting, 
discussion of the CHI 2006 conference ignited a shouting match 
between academics and practitioners.2 This outbreak of emotion 
illustrates the tension between the different groups, and it can be 
explained by taking a closer look at their values, and at the barriers 
that separate them. Snow3 was the first to talk about such barriers, 
even though he focused on only two cultures: the scientific and the 
literary intellectuals. While his political ideas have become somewhat 
obsolete with the decline of the USSR, his vision for the benefits of 
cooperating experts still holds:
The clashing point of two subjects, two disciplines, two 
cultures—of two galaxies, so far as that goes—ought to 
produce creative chances. In the history of mental activity 
that has been where some of the break-throughs came.4
More recently, John Carroll5 suggested that “An integrated 
and effective HCI can be a turning point in both disciplines and, 
perhaps, in human history.” He also acknowledged several rifts that 
run through the HCI community. Cooperation remains difficult. 
At the CHI 2006 conference itself, this conflict was evident in the 
“Design: Creative and Historical Perspectives” session. Paul Dourish 
took the role of defending the science of ethnography against its 
degradation to a service for designers.6 Next, Tracee Verring Wolf and 
Jennifer Rode defended creative design against the criticism of scien-
tists by referring to design rigor that is as critical as scientific rigor.7 
Both groups felt the need to defend themselves, which showed that 
they had the feeling of being under attack. Stuart Feldman, president 
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of the ACM, wrote another chapter in this conflict. In his opening 
speech at the CHI 2007 conference, he made an astonishing statement 
about the HCI community:
It is also wonderful to have a group that is absolutely 
adherent to the classic scientific method. Not a description, 
I am afraid, of all the fields in computing.
However, it is obvious that the methods used by the HCI community 
are as diverse as its members. So, by emphasizing the classical scien-
tific method above all other methods, Feldman was expressing the 
ACM’s expectation of what methods the HCI community should use. 
This preference for the scientific method also manifests itself in the 
division of the CHI proceedings into “main conference proceedings” 
and “extended abstracts.” The “main” proceedings are considered to 
be of higher quality, as the name already suggests, and they include 
a high proportion of scientific studies. These papers usually receive 
more presentation time at the conference. Nonscientific studies, such 
as experience reports and case studies, are more often found in the 
extended abstracts. This division also is reflected in Citeseer’s esti-
mates: the impact of the main proceedings is 1.61; while his estimate 
for the CHI extended abstracts is 0.51 (as of May 2003). Furthermore, 
the main proceedings use the “archival format,” while the extended 
abstracts do not. The omission of the term “archival” from the format 
of the extended abstracts suggests that these publications are not 
important enough to be archived. However, both types of publica-
tions are being stored in the ACM digital library, which turns this 
distinction into a symbolic gesture. At the risk of oversimplification, 
it can be observed that scientific studies are more highly regarded, 
and thus published in the archival main proceedings; while nonsci-
entific studies are less highly regarded, and are published only in 
the non-archival, extended abstracts. But why would the designers 
bother about this division? Their main focus is on improving society 
directly through the invention of artifacts, and not through writing 
papers. Chalmers gives us a hint:
Science is highly esteemed. Apparently, it is a widely held 
belief that there is something special about science and its 
methods. The naming of some claim or line of reasoning 
or piece of research “scientific” is done in a way that is 
intended to imply some kind of merit or special kind of 
reliability.8
 
Being able to use such a powerful term to describe one’s own activi-
ties is very attractive. Declaring that something has been designed 
does not carry as much value as declaring that something is scien-
tifically proven. References to science also are frequently used to 
advertise products. For years, the Odol mouth refresher produced 
by GlaxoSmithKline claimed on its label: “According to the current 
state of scientific knowledge it can be shown that Odol is particularly 
8 A. F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called 
Science? (Indianapolis: Hackett, 3rd ed., 
1999).
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to be recommended for complete mouth care.” It follows that the 
denial of the status “scientific” to a study is a negative value judg-
ment. Engineers, in particular, are very sensitive to the view that 
technology is hierarchically subordinate to science, serving only to 
deduce the implications of scientific discoveries, and to give them 
practical application. This sensitivity becomes clear in provocative 
statements by engineers such as Vincenti:
Airplanes are not designed by science, but by art, in spite of 
some pretence and humbug to the contrary.9
Even though science is highly esteemed, Chalmers10 argued that 
“There is no general account of science and scientific method to be 
had that applies to all sciences at all historical stages in their devel-
opment.” Cross, Naughton, and Walker11 even suggested that the 
confusing epistemology of science may be unable to function as a 
blueprint for the epistemology of design. Levy12 then suggested that 
transformations within the epistemology of science should be seen as 
active growth and development, and that they should be considered 
as providing an opportunity for design to participate in its ongoing 
improvement. As a matter of fact, any person can, in principle, 
contribute to the growth of science. It is an old rule of logic that the 
competence of a speaker has no relevance to the truth of what he 
says. The world’s biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that 
doesn’t make it dark outside.13 Designers and engineers can discover 
new knowledge without applying the classic scientific method or 
becoming a scientist. The more important question is how valuable 
this new knowledge is, and how efficient their methods are in finding 
it. Therefore, in the first part of this paper, I would like to discuss 
criteria that serve to assess the quality of knowledge. If design wants 
to make a contribution to science, then its insights must be judged 
against these criteria. By comparing the quality criteria of science 
with those of traditional design, the similarities and differences of 
the respective communities will become apparent. This comparison 
also may provide insights into the direction in which design methods 
have to evolve to become more scientific. This study does not attempt 
to discuss nonscientific knowledge that designers create for other 
designers. Many design books, for example, provide hands-on and 
relevant knowledge for the design practitioner. This knowledge does 
not attempt to be scientific, and it will not help to define a design 
science. It is, therefore, not in the scope of this study.
This comparison of quality criteria does also not imply that 
design should use the classical scientific method. Cross provided 
an excellent historical review of the developments in the various 
design methodologies.14 He attested to a healthy growth in the field 
during the 1980s. The design community may continue to define 
its own method to turn itself into design science, as was attempted 
at the CHI 2007 workshops on “Converging on a Science of Design 
through the Synthesis of Design Methodologies,”15 and on “Exploring 
9 Walter G. Vincenti, What Engineers 
Know and How They Know It: Analytical 
Studies from Aeronautical History, 
Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of 
Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990).
10 A. F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called 
Science? (Indianapolis: Hackett, 3rd ed., 
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11 Nigel Cross, John Naughton, and David 
Walker, “Design Method and Scientific 
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195–201.
12 R. Levy, “Science, Technology and 
Design,” Design Studies 6:2 (1985): 
66–72.
13 Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of 
Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into 
Values (New York: Morrow, 1974).
14 Nigel Cross, “Science and Design 
Methodology: A Review,” Research in 
Engineering Design 5:2 (1993): 63–69.
15 Gerhard Fischer, Elisa Giaccardi, 
Yunwen Ye, Chris DiGiano, and Kumiyo 
Nakakoji, “Converging on a Science of 
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Factors in Computing Systems, San Jose, 
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Design as a Research Activity.16 In the second part of this paper, I will 
challenge this goal of defining a design science, and try to outline a 
possible solution.
Before diving into these topics, it appears necessary to clarify 
the terminology of this paper. The different interpretations of the 
word “research” alone account for considerable friction between 
designers and scientists. Scientists can barely resist pointing out that 
designers’ research does not provide reliable and valid knowledge. It 
follows that design decisions made on this basis are also in doubt. 
First, we need to distinguish between the verb “research” and 
the noun “research.” When designers, in particular practitioners, do 
research they predominantly collect relevant information. For scien-
tists, “to research” describes the activity of conducting science, and 
the noun “research” is used as a synonym for “science.” Since there 
is no verb form of “science,” it appears necessary to continue to use 
the verb “research” for it. It follows that the activities of designers 
to collect information must be labeled with a different term, and 
“to explore” appears a good choice. A design science project that 
does not use the classical scientific method can then be described 
as “an exploration.” Having clarified this important term, we may 
now proceed to discuss the quality criteria. The scientific reader may 
be familiar with them, and hence there is a danger of preaching to 
the converted. However, the comparison with related criteria in 
design may still be enlightening. Many of the concepts discussed 
are still under discussion. The meaning of truth, for example, has 
been disputed for more than 2000 years, and one can easily get lost in 
the labyrinth of arguments. The intention of this study is to attempt 
an overview, and the interested reader may further indulge in the 
specific topics by consulting the references provided. The overview 
might also help designers to better judge the quality of scientific 
studies they intend to utilize.
Quality Criteria for Science and Design
The generalizability of scientific knowledge is one of the most impor-
tant criteria. It describes the degree to which general statements can 
be derived from a particular statement. The more general statements 
that can be derived, the better the particular statement. Newton’s law 
of gravity was not only able to describe the behavior of the apple that 
inspired him, but also all other apples, fruits, organic materials, and 
inorganic materials. Even the motion of the stars could be described 
by it. His law, therefore, is of high value. If, on the other hand, a 
statement depends on the individual researcher, then its generaliz-
ability is low. If I state: “Bugs are awful.” this may hold true only for 
people who share my paranoia about small creatures with many legs. 
Thus, objectivity is a good method for increasing the generalizability 
of a statement. Generalizability also is related to the repeatability of 
an experiment. If the results of an experiment are objective, meaning 
16 Matthew R. Peters, Steven Haynes, David 
J. Saab, Helena Mentis, and Abigail 
Durrant, “Exploring Design as a Research 
Activity.” Paper presented at the CHI ’07 
Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, San Jose, CA, 2007.
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that they are not dependent on the experimenter, then others should 
be able to repeat the experiment with exactly the same results. But, 
of course, not every repeatable experiment is automatically highly 
generalizable. If an experiment is conducted with only undergrad 
psychology students as participants, it may easily be repeatable; but 
the results may not be generizable to senior citizens.
Designers know a similar concept: “universality.” It describes 
the degree to which general problems can be solved by a particular 
solution. The more universal a solution is the better. A hammer, for 
example, is more universal than a pair of horseshoe pliers, and hence 
more valuable. However, there often is a tradeoff between effective-
ness and universality. Specific solutions usually work better than 
general solutions at the price of having to create a solution for each 
problem. The challenge is to find the right balance between univer-
sality and effectiveness. Science, on the other hand, strives towards 
the highest level of generalizability.
The knowledge that designers typically create in their design 
projects, suffers from its lack of generalizability. The solutions found 
for a given problem are limited to the scope of that problem, and 
cannot be applied easily, if at all, to different problems. Also, the 
solutions are dependent on the individual designer. A different 
designer might have come up with a different solution.
Falsifiability is another important criterion that is known to 
both scientists and designers. Originally proposed by Karl Popper 
in 2002, “falsifiability” describes the property of statements that they 
must admit of logical and empirical counterexamples. The latter 
refers to the condition that it must be possible, at least in principle, 
to make an observation that would show the statement to be wrong, 
even if that observation is not actually made. The statement “all 
swans are white” is in principle falsifiable by observing a black swan. 
The higher the number of logical and empirical counterexamples that 
a statement withstands, the higher is its value.
The use of falsifiability in design is similar. A solution must 
admit the existence of logical and empirical counterexamples. If, 
for example, a certain device is intended to continuously increase 
one’s karma, then its function is impossible to falsify. Such a device 
could not be considered a design. Falsifiability plays a less important 
role in design in comparison with science, since it often deals with 
concrete and well-defined problems. The effects of a solution usually 
are easy to observe, and this criterion overlaps with the criterion of 
effectiveness that will be discussed later. 
Truth is a key criterion in science, and it also plays an impor-
tant role in design. However, its definition is still an object of philo-
sophical discussion, and so multiple definitions of truth exist at this 
point in time. An in-depth discussion about the underlying philo-
sophical issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but the interested 
reader may consult Kirkham,17 who offers a survey of all the major 
philosophical theories of truth. The acknowledged Wikipedia18 alone 
17 Richard L. Kirkham, Theories of Truth: 
A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1992).
18 Jim Giles, “Internet Encyclopaedias Go 
Head to Head,” Nature 438:7070 (2005): 
900–1.
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lists many theories of truth including correspondence, coherence, 
constructivist, consensus, pragmatic, performative, semantic, and 
Kripke’s theory. The correspondence and coherence theories prob-
ably are the most acknowledged, so this study focuses on them. In 
the coherence theory, truth is primarily a property of a whole system 
of statements. The truth of a single statement can be derived only 
from its accordance with all the other statements. If a new state-
ment contradicts an existing statement, then both statements need 
to be reconsidered. In the previously used example of swans, one of 
the statements must be false. Either not all swans are white or the 
particular swan is not black. The equivalent concept in design is 
known as “compatibility.” If a new component is introduced to an 
existing system, then it should not prevent any existing component 
from operating correctly. For example, the installation of new soft-
ware on a computer can lead to incompatibilities in which previous 
functions cease to operate.
The correspondence theory of truth deals with the relation-
ship between statements and reality. If theories correspond to obser-
vations in reality, they are considered to be true. This direction in 
the relationship between truth and reality usually is attributed to 
science. The other direction can be attributed to design. If an artifact 
corresponds to theory, then it is considered true. Our understanding 
of the physical world makes it difficult to invent artifacts that could 
not be explained fully by existing theories of physics. Many attempts 
have been made to invent a perpetual motion machine, and patents 
have even been filed, but no working model has ever been built. The 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refuses to grant 
patents for perpetual motion machines without a working model:
With the exception of cases involving perpetual motion, a 
model is not ordinarily required by the Office to demon-
strate the operability of a device. - 608.03 Models, Exhibits, 
Specimens [R-3].
However, solutions often have been used without full theoretical 
understanding. The Bayer Company patented aspirin as early as 
1899, and has successfully marketed it ever since. Its pain-relieving 
effect was not understood until 1971. In 1982, John Robert Vane 
received the Nobel Prize in the Physiology of Medicine for this 
discovery.
Another important quality criterion for scientific knowledge 
is novelty. Rediscovering Newton’s Law has little value. But newness 
in itself is not sufficient. A novel scientific theory does not only 
need to be different from existing theories, but it also has to explain 
more than existing theories. Galileo’s theories extended Aristotle’s; 
Newton’s Law extended Galileo’s theories; and Einstein’s extended 
Newton’s. In design, the same principle is known as “innovation.” 
Novelty, in its pure “newness” definition, is even a requirement 
for patents. Moreover, new artifacts are expected to work not only 
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differently, but also better. Modern PCs are currently even powerful 
enough to completely simulate older computers, for example, simu-
lating the Commodore 64 using the VICE emulator. Modern PCs can 
do everything that older ones can, and more.
The criterion of parsimony, also known as “Occam’s razor,” 
is the preference for the least complex statement to explain a fact. A 
good example can be found in the field of astronomy. The Copernican 
model is said to have been chosen over the Ptolemaic due to its 
greater simplicity. The Ptolemaic model, in order to explain the 
apparent retrograde motion of Mercury relative to Venus, posited the 
existence of epicycles within the orbit of Mercury. The Copernican 
model (as expanded by Kepler) was able to account for this motion 
by displacing the Earth from the center of the solar system and 
replacing it with the Sun as the orbital focus of planetary motions, 
while simultaneously replacing the circular orbits of the Ptolemaic 
model with elliptical ones. In addition, the Copernican model 
excluded any mention of the crystalline spheres that the planets 
were thought to be embedded in according to the Ptolemaic model. 
At a single stroke, the Copernican model reduced the complexity of 
astronomy by a factor of two.
In design, simplicity plays a similar role. Simplicity is the 
preference for the least complex solution to achieve a given goal. Just 
twenty years ago, the only way to print a photo required a complete 
photochemical process that involved various toxic chemicals and 
sophisticated machines. These days, everybody can print his own 
pictures with cheap inkjet printers.
Finally, the scientific criteria of accuracy, precision, and effi-
ciency are discussed, together with their counterparts in design: 
effectiveness, reliability, and efficiency. Accuracy refers to the degree 
to which a statement or theory predicts the facts it is intended to 
predict, while precision refers to the degree to which a statement or 
theory predicts the exact same facts. The analogy of bullets shot at a 
target is useful to explain the difference between these two related 
concepts and, at the same time, to show the similarity between 
design and science criteria.
In this analogy, a gun firing at a target (design) parallels a 
theory predicting observations (science). The “effectiveness” of the 
gun describes the closeness of the bullets to the center of the target 
(see Figure 1). Bullets that strike closer to the center are considered 
more effective. The parallel is that the closer the observations concur 
with the predictions of the theory, the more accurate the theory.
Figure 1 
High effectiveness but low reliability (left); 
high reliability but low effectiveness (middle); 
and high reliability and high effectiveness 
(right).
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To continue the analogy, the reliability of the gun refers to the spread 
of the bullets. The closer together the bullets strike, the higher the 
reliability (see Figure 1, middle). In science, the closer the observa-
tions are to each other, the more precise is the theory. The bullets do 
not necessarily need to be close to the center for this. The bullets (or 
observations) can be reliable (precise) without being effective (accu-
rate). However, for bullets (and observations) to be perfectly effective 
(accurate), they also need to be reliable (precise) (see Figure 1).
For science, efficiency refers to the resources expended in rela-
tion to the precision and accuracy of the observations predicted, and 
for design, efficiency refers to the resources expended in relation to 
the effectiveness and reliability of the goals achieved.
So far, only those quality criteria of design that have a direct 
relation to the quality criteria of science have been discussed. Of 
course, design also has criteria that are of less relevance to science. 
Conformity to social customs, popularity, ego satisfaction, reputa-
tion, pleasure, and commercial success are examples. It is difficult 
to define general design criteria, since each design can be judged 
only in its specific context of use. The Hummer sport utility vehicle 
(SUV), for example, is a car that is not intended to be environmental 
friendly, so it should not be judged by the fuel consumption criterion. 
The Hummer SUVs are not designed for driving fuel-efficiently from 
points A to B.
Conclusions on Quality
At first sight, there appears to be a considerable overlap in the 
quality criteria for design and science. Pirsig19 attested that they are 
just two different complementary ways of looking at the same thing. 
At the most immediate level (dynamic quality), they have never been 
separate. Pirsig provides a description of dynamic quality as being 
“the continuing stimulus which our environment puts upon us to 
create the world in which we live.”20 The sense of quality that guides 
a scientist in selecting a certain hypothesis for further investigation is 
the same sense for quality that helps designers to choose one solution 
over another. Both disciplines are creative: designers create primarily 
artifacts, and scientists primarily knowledge. This similarity may 
mislead people into believing that design already is a science. In 
the next section, I will discuss the possibility of a design science. 
For now, I would like to characterize the different quality criteria 
using the Metaphysics of Quality (MOQ) framework.21 Of course, it 
is impossible to provide an exhaustive description of his work within 
the limited space available, but the interested reader may consider 
Anthony McWatt’s thesis as a starting point for delving deeper into 
this philosophical idea.22
Besides dynamic quality, Pirsig distinguishes four static 
quality patterns (see Figure 2) that have evolved over time, and that 
are ordered in a hierarchy from the inorganic (lowest coherence) 
to the intellectual (highest coherence). The highest pattern contains 
19 Robert M. Pirsig, “Subjects, Objects, 
Data & Values.” Paper presented at the 
Einstein Meets Magritte Symposium, 
Vrije University, Brussels, 1995.
20 Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of 
Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into 
Values (New York: Morrow, 1974).
21 Robert M. Pirsig, Lila: An Inquiry into 
Morals (New York: Bantam Books, 1991).
22 Anthony McWatt, “An Introduction to 
Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality.” 
PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 2003.
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intellectual patterns such as theology, science, and philosophy. 
This pattern is confined to the skilled manipulation of abstract 
symbols that have no specific corresponding experience, and behave 
according to rules of their own.23 Social patterns include such institu-
tions as family, church, and government. They are the patterns of 
culture that the anthropologist and sociologist study. 
The hierarchical structure of the patterns suggests that the 
intellectual pattern takes precedence over social, biological, and 
inorganic matters. During the Renaissance, science rejected religious 
dogmas, social prejudices, and biological emotions to set its own 
higher intellectual patterns such as truth. When science is mixed 
with social patterns, such as religion, it can quite correctly be argued 
that these patterns corrupt science. The times in which the church 
could dictate truth are hopefully over, and even Galileo was rehabili-
tated by Pope John Paul II in 1992. However, the recent upsurge of 
creationism is alarming, and we can only hope that the intellectual 
value of truth will continue to prevail over religious beliefs, as it did 
in the Dover, Pennsylvania, case.24 In this court case, the attempt of 
creationists to introduce their religious ideas into the biology science 
class of a Dover public high school was successfully blocked. In a 
similar fashion, social patterns are superior to biological patterns. 
The value of a stable family overrides the value of spreading one’s 
genes as much as possible through adultery.
While there is a hierarchy of quality patterns, they are still 
dependent on each other. Every intellectual pattern also is a social 
and biological pattern, but not every social pattern is an intellec-
tual one. The ideas of science come from scientists who work in a 
community and need food to survive. However, not every commu-
nity produces scientific knowledge, and not every animal forms 
communities.
The quality criteria of design (universality, falsifiability, 
compatibility, correspondence to theory, novelty, simplicity, reli-
ability, effectiveness, and efficiency) operate predominately at the 
social level. Designers, in particular practitioners, create artifacts to 
transform the world into a desired state.25 Their results are essen-
tial to society, but remain subordinate to the intellectual level at 
which science operates. Notice that “intellectual” does not refer 
Figure 2 
The evolutionary order of static  
quality patterns.
23 Robert M. Pirsig, “Letter to Paul Turner 
Dated September 23rd, 2003.” 
24 Judge Jones, Tammy Kitzmiller, et al. v. 
Dover Area School District, et al. Case 
4:04-cv-02688-JEJ (2005): 1–139.
25 Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the 
Artificial (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3rd 
ed., 1996).
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to the social title of being an intellectual, but to the quality pattern 
described above. Of course, designers can be intellectuals. With 
respect to dynamic quality, design and science are similar. But in 
the framework of static quality patterns, they differ. If design wants 
to contribute to the growth of scientific knowledge, then it will 
primarily have to improve the generalizability of its results. Most 
of all, to guarantee objectivity, its results need to become indepen-
dent of the designer. Pitt claimed26 that such a method would lead to 
knowledge that is “far more reliable, secure, and trustworthy than 
scientific knowledge.”
So far, I have considered design in its classic form in which 
it does not qualify as a science. Still, it does have the potential to 
contribute to the growth of scientific knowledge. Next, I would like 
to discuss the challenges faced by design when it attempts to become 
a science. 
The Challenge of a Design Science
Science consists of a method for observing reality and abstract-
ing it into models that are then used to explain and predict reality. 
Newton’s law of gravity, for example, explains why an apple hit 
Isaac Newton, and it also helps us to predict the position of the plan-
ets in the future. The various sciences claim certain parts of reality as 
their phenomena under investigation.
The methods of science are to some degree universal, and 
often are referred to as “scientific method.” The scientific method 
is a body of techniques for investigating phenomena and acquiring 
new knowledge, as well as for correcting and integrating existing 
knowledge. It is based on gathering observable, empirical, measur-
able evidence, subject to the principles of reasoning. Chalmers27 
provides an impartial discussion of the scientific method, and this 
is probably what Stuart Feldman had in mind when he referred to 
the classic scientific method. However, a methodology in itself can 
never constitute a science. Let us take the example of the dissection 
method. Biologists may use dissection to analyze animals, but butch-
ers also use it to cut steaks. The method is the same, but one results 
in scientific knowledge, the other in a delicious meal. Moreover, in 
the same way that biology is not a science of how biologists work, 
design science cannot be a science of how designers work. This 
conceptual limitation cannot be overcome even by converging on a 
specific design method. Again, a method does not constitute a sci-
ence, and design methodologies cannot be the phenomena of design 
science. 
The sciences distinguish themselves not through their meth-
ods, but through the phenomena they investigate. Biology, for 
example, is the science of living organisms. What a design science 
is primarily missing is a phenomenon. This demarcation problem 
becomes clearer when we consider that the prime objective of design 
lies at the intersection between artifacts and users (see Figure 3). 
26 Joseph C. Pitt, “What Engineers Know” 
In Techne 5:3 (2001): 17–30.
27 A. F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called 
Science? (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 3rd 
ed., 1999).
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Designers contribute to the creation of artifacts that interact with 
humans.
Everything there is to know about the artifact (Figure 3) is 
available from its manufacturer. Its dimensions, material proper-
ties, and functions are known. The artifacts, therefore, are not good 
phenomena for investigation. Also the creation of new materials and 
operational principles already has been claimed by engineering and 
physics. Engineers also discuss rational design methodology that 
relies heavily on mathematics.28 Interestingly, these rational design 
methodologies are not often used in the area of design, even though 
they have one fundamental characteristic that brings them closer 
to science: the results produced through these methods are objec-
tive. This means that the results are independent of the designer 
who applies them. This independence is a major step forward in 
the direction of generalizability. When we take a look at the body 
of scientific knowledge, we also see that it is engineers who have 
attempted to create a consistent and logical body of knowledge for 
design solutions.29
On the other hand (Figure 3), understanding human beings 
is the prime objective of medicine, anthropology, and psychology. 
Design science would have difficulty in competing. Even “design 
methodology” or, to be more general, “solving human prob-
lems,” already has been treated as a phenomenon investigated by 
psychologists.30
As we can see, both artifacts and humans have been claimed 
as phenomena by physics, engineering, psychology, and medicine. 
The definition of a design phenomenon is possibly the most urgent 
step in the development of a design science. The arena of design 
science is filled with actors from many different disciplines, and one 
may then ask why the designers in the HCI community are so keen 
on turning design into a science? 
It is a noble goal to create good and reliable design that 
improves society, but this cannot be achieved by using the scientific 
method, nor can the claim of a design science be a good response 
to the criticisms of scientists. Not everything has to be scientific, 
and designers are playing an important role in the creation of arti-
facts. They should be proud of the role they already play in the HCI 
community. 
If we attempt to turn design into a science, then we face 
the demarcation problem that will be difficult to overcome unless 
Figure 3 
The phenomenon of design.
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we resolve the subject-object dichotomy that was highlighted by 
Descartes.31 In this duality, objective knowledge is superior to subjec-
tive knowledge, and together they constitute an antagonistic relation-
ship that constantly generates dichotomies: mind and matter, science 
and art, and feeling and reason.32 The Metaphysics of Quality has 
the potential to overcome this dichotomy. It reduces this duality to a 
secondary role, and places quality alone at the top (see Figure 4) as 
“the parent, the source of all subjects and objects.”33 
Even though quality itself cannot be defined, its existence 
can be proved. Pirsig provides a pragmatic proof by subtracting it 
from the description of our world, and showing that a world without 
quality would be dysfunctional.34 To understand this statement, one 
has to detail the process of quality (see Figure 5). Our environment 
presents us with a quality stimulus, which we sense pre-intellectu-
ally before we intellectualize it, thereby dividing it into subjects and 
objects. 
The pre-intellectual sensitivity to quality can be compared 
to Kant’s a priori pure cognition of time and space. It can even be 
argued that quality might fulfill Kant’s requirements of necessity 
and universality, and thus may be considered a third form of a priori 
pure cognition. Pirsig describes the sense of quality this way:
This sense [for quality] is not just something you are born 
with, although you are born with it. It is also something you 
can develop. It is not just “intuition” not just unexplain-
Figure 4 
Ontology of Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality
31 R. Descartes, Principia Philosophiae 
(Amsterdam: Danielem Elzevirium, 1644).
32 George Basalla, “Man and Machine,” 
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able “skill” or “talent.” It is the direct result of contact with 
basic reality, Quality, which dualistic reason has in the past 
tended to conceal.35
Dynamic quality, and its division into classical and romantic quality, 
is of most importance, since it is the point connecting science and 
design:
What relates science to the arts [design] is that science 
explores the Conceptually Unknown [dynamic quality] 
in order to develop a theory that will cover measurable 
patterns emerging from the unknown. The arts [design] 
explore the Conceptually Unknown [dynamic quality] 
in other ways to create patterns such as music, literature, 
painting, that reveal the Dynamic Quality that produces 
them. (Square brackets were added by the author)36
The MOQ’s view of the world as shown in Figure 4 is now able to 
overcome the subject-object dichotomy and the difficulties it creates 
for defining the phenomena of design science. Design science should 
focus on what is inherent to both subjects and objects: quality. Design 
science is the science of quality. 
Discussion
Science has established several criteria for assessing the quality of 
the knowledge it produces. Some of these criteria overlap or relate 
to criteria that are used in design. Design methods are not yet opti-
mized for the creation of scientific knowledge, and therefore they 
generally produce knowledge that is of lesser scientific quality. Their 
weakest area is generalizability, since the knowledge produced is 
often based on the individual designer. Currently, designers who 
want to work as scientists often have to become either engineers 
and work within a rational problem-solving framework,37 or they 
can choose to become psychologists. John Carroll suggested that 
psychology could be considered a science of design.38 Since designers 
often lack training in these disciplines, they have a natural disadvan-
tage. It would be preferable if they could become scientists without 
becoming bad engineers or bad psychologists. To create a design 
science, we first need to define its phenomena. This can be achieved 
by overcoming the subject-object dichotomy. The Metaphysics of 
Quality has the potential to bridge the gap between subjects and 
objects, and by doing so it also defines the phenomena of design 
science: quality. The formal recognition of quality will then also have 
a direct influence on science:
I think that it will be found that a formal acknowledge-
ment of the role of Quality in the scientific process does not 
destroy the empirical vision at all. It expands it, strengthens 
it and brings it far closer to actual scientific practice… By 
returning our attention to Quality it is hoped that we can 
get technological work out of the non-caring subject-object 
35 Ibid., 225. 
36 Robert M. Pirsig, “Subjects, Objects, 
Data & Values.” 
37 Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the 
Artificial.
38 J. M. Carroll, “Human-Computer 
Interaction: Psychology as a Science of 
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dualism and back into craftsmanlike self-involved reality 
again, which will reveal to us the facts we need when we 
are stuck.39
But would knowledge about quality be generalizable? A common 
criticism of Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality is the question of how 
we could possibly disagree on quality when quality is supposed to 
be universal. How is it possible that we have difficulties agreeing on 
which is the better poem? Pirsig considers that our previous experi-
ences influence our perception of quality:
The names, the shapes and forms we give quality depend 
only partly on the quality. They also depend partly on the 
a priori images we have accumulated in our memory. We 
constantly seek to find, in the quality event, analogues to 
our previous experiences. If we didn’t, we’d be unable to 
act. We build up our language in terms of these analogues… 
The reason people see Quality differently is because people 
come to it with different sets of analogues.40
Pirsig speculated that, if two people had identical a priori analogues, 
they would see quality identically every time. This still would not 
explain why listening to a new record over and over again can 
change the experience from being exciting to being boring. In his 
second book,41 Pirsig modifies his previous division of quality 
(classical and romantic) to static and dynamic quality, in which 
“dynamic quality” represents both romantic and classical quality. 
The main advantage of this division is that it prevents the percep-
tion that quality consists of two fundamentally different types: clas-
sical and romantic. Furthermore, dynamic quality can more easily 
include mystical experiences which, according to Pirsig, are not well 
described by romantic quality. The division between dynamic and 
static quality can then easily explain the change of experience after 
listening to a record numerous times. It changes from a dynamic to 
a static quality pattern. This new division also provides a different 
way of looking at the disagreement on which poem is better. While 
dynamic quality is the same for everyone, and therefore generaliz-
able, static quality patterns depend on the individual’s prior experi-
ences. When judging a poem, we use both dynamic quality and static 
quality, which results in some uniformity between individuals; but 
not complete uniformity. 
What is not yet clear is the degree to which the classical scien-
tific method can be used to investigate quality because it is based 
on the assumption that subjects and objects are not connected. The 
investigator is not supposed to influence the phenomenon under 
investigation. Quality is the source of subjects and objects, so a 
method that presupposes that they are not connected may be unsuit-
able for investigating it. 
The main challenge for a design science is the definition of 
a method that may be capable of investigating quality, but at least 
39 Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of 
Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into 
Values. (p. 224) 
40 lbid.
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Design Issues:  Volume 25, Number 2  Spring 200960
some first attempts have been made. Nakashima et al.42 attempted 
to make implicit quality knowledge of executing a task explicit 
in order to measure if this knowledge would help a second user 
improve his performance. Zimmerman et al.43 emphasizes the benefit 
of creating artifacts for HCI research, and also propose four criteria 
for the evaluation of its success (process, invention, relevance, and 
extensibility).
Compared to this methodological challenge for design 
science, the popular separation of design and science into activi-
ties that transform the world into a desired state (design) versus 
activities that attempt to understand the world (science) can easily 
be overcome. The prime reason for the existence of science is the 
assumption that a state of knowing is better than a state of ignorance. 
By definition, this turns all scientific activities into design activities. It 
is unlikely that many scientists would feel comfortable with this clas-
sification of their work, but the fundamental argument remains.
Until considerable progress has been made in defining 
a suitable epistemology for design science, we shall have to take 
small steps forward using current methods and policies. Design 
has to acknowledge that the knowledge it produces is, from a scien-
tific perspective, not very generalizable, and thus of lesser value. 
However, from a design perspective, it may very well be valuable 
since its concreteness makes it easy to use in everyday practice. 
Schön44 even argued that “wicked design problems” may resist 
formalization, and hence cannot be approached with a pure scien-
tific approach. The concrete design knowledge may then be the best 
approximation to scientific knowledge. 
Design also has to acknowledge that its focus is on the social, 
and not on the intellectual, level. Scientists, on the other hand, need 
to acknowledge that the highly general knowledge they produce 
often is too abstract to improve society. It requires a skilled designer 
to translate this knowledge into a specific context of use.
The hierarchy levels of static quality patterns may even 
justify the division of the CHI proceedings into sections. However, 
it would be wise to follow Confucius’ recommendation to “rectify 
the names.” Labeling only one section “archival” when both sections 
will be stored in the ACM Digital Library is confusing. Also, the 
labels “main proceedings” and “extended abstracts” are ambiguous. 
Pirsig’s quality patterns appear suitable for defining the sections, but 
the terms “intellectual” and “social” carry different meanings in the 
various sub-communities, and may cause misunderstandings. Maybe 
the sections could be called “Discovery” and “Invention.” The latter 
would collect contributions that are aimed at improving society, and 
that operate on Pirsig’s social level. The discovery section would 
gather contributions that present scientific insights, and operate 
at the intellectual level. Whatever principle is used to divide the 
proceedings, it should be made explicit.
The use of “best paper” awards is another ranking method. 
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Excellence should be rewarded. However, rankings should not be 
used to discriminate between communities. Excellence can be found 
in design papers as well as in scientific papers. The factors that influ-
ence paper rankings should be made explicit. This would require 
the agreement of the community on the factors used. The CHI 
community is diverse, and it may be difficult to reach agreement. 
But nothing worthwhile is ever easy. As long as no shared quality 
criteria are defined for the community as a whole, it will remain a 
trans–disciplinary rather than a multidisciplinary community. We 
will continue to tolerate each other rather than contributing to each 
other’s success. The sub-communities of design, education, engi-
neering, management, research, and usability will coexist, but future 
shouting matches cannot be excluded. 
Conclusion
The comparison of the quality criteria used in design and science 
hopefully creates a better mutual understanding between these two 
communities, and a guide towards a design science. The classical 
scientific method does not appear to be suitable for the investigation 
of the phenomenon of design science: quality. While this study is not 
able to propose a new investigation method, it at least pointed out 
one of its requirements. Based on the Metaphysics of Quality, it has 
been concluded that the method of design science must overcome the 
subject-object dichotomy. This ambitious goal may not be achieved 
quickly, and thus we also need to focus on the small steps to improve 
the HCI community. The observations and suggestions we made for 
the CHI conference may create a better and more equal framework 
in which the different sub-communities inspire each other.
